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This paper analyzes possible incidences of Turkish EU accession on the emigration 
from Turkey to the European Union. Panel data estimators are applied on the 
emigration data from EU-18 into Germany in order to construct possible future 
scenarios of Turkish migration to the EU. Eventual migration flows from Turkey 
into the EU are forecasted based on the estimated results.  
We find that seemingly unrelated regressor is the most efficient estimator that can 
be applied in Turkey-EU migration framework. Our results reveal that both the 
network effect and target country labour market conditions represent the strongest 
determinants for migration, whilst the effect of per capita income is actually 
relatively low. In particular, Turkish per capita income does not have nearly any 
effect on migration, because it enters the model in two variables that work against 
each other. Furthermore, a very low importance of opening the German labour 
market for Turkish migrants is found. Estimated coefficients are used to predict 
migrations to Germany and through appropriate extrapolations to the whole 
European Union (EU). Three scenarios of migration are created and the sensitivity 
of estimated coefficients on migration from Turkey into the Germany during next 
25 years is further discussed in detail.  
 
Keywords: Economy of migration, Turkey, EU Enlargement, panel data, seemingly 
unrelated regression  
 
















It should be rightfully acknowledged that the relationship of the European Union (EU) and 
Turkey nowadays is far more complicated than that of EU and any other European country 
seeking EU membership. Since  the  12
th  of  September 1 963,  when  Turkey s igned an 
Association Agreement (called “the Ankara Treaty”) with the European Communities and 
became an associate member of the EC and with EC representatives proclaiming that Turkey 
was a “ part of Europe”, the European Union has been facing a tough decision trying to find 
an answer to everlasting question of: “ What to do with Turkey?” (Miiftiiler-Bac, 1997).  
There is n o  doubt that  eventual  Turkish  EU  accession  would have  had  considerable 
economic, institutional and social implications both for Turkey itself and for the European 
Union. For  quite some time,  researchers analyzed  EU-Turkish trade  relations  (see for 
example Völker, 1976; Marguiles, 1996; Sayek and Selover, 2002; Derviş , Gros, Ö ztrak, and 
Işık, 2004; Ulgen and Zahariadis, 2004) as well as possible consequences of Turkey joining 
the EC or/and the EU (see for example Lejour, de Mooij, and Capel, 2004; Flam, 2004; 
Quaisser and Wood, 2004; Lammers, 2006). Turkish EU membership clearly might generate 
benefits for Turkey from entering the EU Common Market as well as bring about narrowing 
income differences and improving economic and trade relations.  However, the most 
fundamental question in the debate about Turkish EU membership is the issue of Turkish 
migrations to the European Union and the side effects of these migrations. 
Turkey is a large country with the total population of over 70 million of people; that is why it 
can be compared with other large EU Members State such as Germany or United Kingdom. 
However, Turkish GDP per capita in market prices is more than six times lower that that of 
the EU15 and almost two times lower than in EU10 (Eurostat, 2007). Despite the fact that 
Turkish economy  was very dynamic in  the  last five years, the economic importance of 
Turkey in Europe remains minor. Even if its rapid economic growth continues until 2015,   2 
Turkey will remain a poor neighbour  for the majority of the EU27 states. According to 
Lammers (2006), Turkey’s income per capita at market prices in 2015 will be just 20 % from 
the EU27 average.  
On that economic background migration Turkish migration potentials might look quite grim 
for the EU Member States. Martin, Midgley and Teitelbaum (2001) remark that there are 
about 3.5 million Turks living abroad nowadays and of those 3 million reside in the EU (with 
70 % of EU-based Turks staying in Germany). This high proximity to migration amongst 
relatively young and dynamic Turkish population (the average age is 27.7 for men and 28.8 
for women) often brings fears that Turkish EU membership would trigger of the wave of 
massive migration; estimates are that 20 to 30 % of Turkish youth would emigrate to seek 
higher wages in Europe if they could do so (Martin, Midgley and Teitelbaum, 2001).  
These fears might never come true, however, as far as much-sought admission to the EU 
might bring EU assistance and FDI that, in turn, create jobs and push up the wages in Turkey 
that would make  labour  migrations i rrelevant. Thence, it seems worth exploring the 
predictions of Turkish migration to the EU after the eventual accession.  
The main purpose of this paper is to come up with an overview of factors determining 
Turkish migrations. Based on the Sjaastad (1962), Harris and Todaro (1970) and Hatton 
(1995) human capital migration approach  econometric tools described in Boeri, Brücker 
(2000) and Alvarez-Plata, Brücker, Siliverstovs (2003)  are applied with an intention to 
estimate and  predict future migrations from Turkey to Germany and to the EU respectively. 
Stages of integration Turkey has to pass on its way to the EU membership and especially the 
timetable of Turkish accession are the main determinants of different migration scenarios 
presented here. Apart from that, this paper elaborates on the following research questions: 
Which are the most important economic variables influencing Turkish migrations to the EU? 
How important is the development of those variables for migration itself and for the EU and 
Turkey separately? And finally: Are there any other than economic determinants influencing 
Turkish-EU migration flows? 
 
 
1. Methodology and literature review. 
 
 
Turkish labour migration to Europe dates back to the early 1960s. The agreement between 
Turkey and West Germany that was signed in 1961 provided West Germany with low-skilled 
temporary workers (so-called “Gastarbeiter” ) on mutually beneficial conditions. War-torn   3 
Germany gained access to the vast pool of cheap labour force, while Turkey benefited by 
decreasing its unemployment rate. Back then, guest-worker agreements were temporary and 
envisaged the return of Turkish workers who would come back home equipped with new 
methods  and representing  high-skilled labour force. Migrations  were fuelled by the 
information about the economic and social benefits of employment in Europe that trickled 
back to Turkey (Sayari, 1996). 
Apart from Germany,  Turkey  also  signed agreement with Austria, Belgium, Holland, 
Sweden and France;  however most of the  Turkish workers went to West Germany and 
Holland. Those guest workers settled down and brought their families with them. The other 
confusion was that instead of low-skilled labor high-skilled workers emigrated from Turkey 
(see for example Güngör and Tansel, 2006). 
The recruitment of Turkish labor came to a halt after the 1973 oil crises. However, Turkish 
emigration to Europe continued in  the  1980s and 1990s, particularly  thanks to family 
reunifications. Another direction of Turkish emigration occurred in  the 1970s. Economic 
boom in Middle East created an incentive for Turkish workers to migrate to countries such as 
Iraq, Libya, and Saudi Arabia (SORT, 2007; Eurostat 2007).  Strong migration outflows 
played an important role in Turkish economy: since 1960s remittances sent by immigrant 
workers abroad constituted the major currency input for Turkey (Kirisci, 2003). 
The 1980s brought the new type of migration: asylum migrations. A sylum seekers from 
Turkey came to Europe due to increase of violence and political instability in Turkey (this 
was especially relevant with regard to the Kurdish minority). This trend lasted until second 
half of 1990s. The latest estimations showed that approximately 3.6 million Turkish nationals 
lived abroad, from which a significant part of 3.2 million resided in the EU (SORT, 2007).  
 
1.1. Target countries for Turkish immigrants 
 
The outward  migration from Turkey  is low at present.  Although the official emigration 
figures are not reported by the Turkish authorities, a considerable decrease in the Turkish 
asylum seekers can be observed: in 2004 it was 16.000 people (1/3 less than in the 2000) 
(SIS, 2007).  In 2004  the stock of Turks living abroad decreased  by 2%  and reached 
approximately 3.5 million. This trend might be attributed to both to naturalization and return 
migrations to Turkey.    4 
Clearly the biggest community of Turks in today’s EU can be found in Germany (more than 
1.750 thousand people) which is about a half of all Turks living abroad. It is apparent that 
approximately 76% of Turks migrating to Europe are going to Germany (Table 1). 
Recently,  emigration from Turkey decreased.  This can be shown on the  decreasing 
importance of remittances  in the Turkish economy that began around  1998. In 2004, 
remittances by the Turkish expatriate community ranged at $800 million or 0.2 % of GNP, 
the lowest level since 1975 ($1.3 billion or 2.8 % of GNP) and a strong decline over 2003 
($1.7 billion or 0.7 % of GNP) (OECD, 2006). Another factor that points at the decrease of 
outward migration is the  cyclic character of migration and furthermore the favorable 
economic conditions in Turkey that are in contrast with economic stagnation in EU15.  
 
Table 1: Stocks of Turks residing in selected EU and EEA countries.    
  2004  % of total  Rank **  Source 
Austria  142  6  1  Labour Force Survey, Statistics Austria 
Belgium  79  3  6  Population register, National Statistical Office. 
Denmark  31  1  1  Statistics Denmark. 
Finland  3  0  10  Central population register, Statistics Finland. 
France  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  Census, National Institute for Statistics and 
Economic Studies (INSEE). 
Germany   1 764  76  1  Statistisches Bundesamt, Wiesbaden 
Greece*  77  3  3  National Statistical Service of Greece. 
Netherlands  196  8  1  Register of Population, Central Bureau of 
Statistics (CBS). 
Norway  9  0  11  Central Population Register, Statistics Norway. 
Sweden  35  1  10  Population register, Statistics Sweden. 
Total   2 336  100      
* Data are from 2001; ** Ranking of minority size in each country 
     
1.2. Germany as a major target EU country for Turkish migrations. 
 
Federal Republic of Germany is currently the largest target EU country for incoming Turkish 
migrations. This is partly caused by the  historical background and partly  by the  lack of 
workforce in Germany after the WWII. Moreover, Turks were not the only one ethnic that 
contributed to German economic growth: Italians, Spaniards and Portuguese also took part in 
boosting upheaval of West German economy that took place in the 1960s.   5 
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Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Wiesbaden, 2006  
 
Figure 1 shows the numbers of Turkish citizens in comparison with all foreigners residing in 
Germany. There was a steady growth in absolute numbers with its peak around 2000 and 
slight decrease after 2001. Furthermore, it can be seen that in relative numbers the record has 
got its peak even earlier. In 1975 Turkish citizens constituted 26 % of all foreigners living in 
Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2007) and by the 1987 they reached the position of the 
most numerous group of foreigners residing in Germany. 
Between 1960s and 2000s Turkish migration underwent several stages. The latest statistics 
showed that it actually decreased since the beginning of the 21
st century.  This might be 
caused by either cyclic character of migration or by the economic situation in the EU and 
Turkey. Furthermore,  the  2004 EU enlargement caused higher competition between 
immigrants within EU due to the increasing amounts of migrants from EU10 countries and 
the substitution effect caused by that. 
Therefore, in spite of high migration inflows from Turkey to the EU in the past, possible 
Turkish accession to the Union should not necessarily lead to the massive influx of 
immigrants. Most economically developed EU countries seem to be already saturated by the 
Turkish labor migrants who have a long tradition of living and working there. Even though, 
future migrations from Turkey to the EU might be caused by other than economic factors, it 
seems interesting to explore the recent trends and to build scenarios of migrations after 
Turkish EU accession: realistic, optimistic and pessimistic. This can be achieved through   6 
studying the data from recent Turkish migrations and extrapolating the data in accordance 




The most notorious problem with estimation of migrations is the lack of the appropriate data. 
Especially historical data about migration stocks and flows are missing  for a number of 
countries. This makes comparisons of different national data very complicated due to the 
differences in methodology used by various states.  
For the estimations used in this paper the data sample for inward migrations to Germany 
during the period of 1967 to 2005, time series from OECD database (complemented by 
AMECO database for the time periods not covered by OECD database) and data from 
Eurostat statistical office were used.  
Migration data used here are compiled from German central register of foreign nationals and 
German  Statistical  Office.  The sample is pooled  for 18 European source countries (i.e. 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Holland, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, Turkey and UK). Former-
USSR countries are excluded from  the data sample due to the political  and data 
incomparability reasons.  
The sample period of dependent variable (that is the share of migrants from home country 
living in Germany as a % of source country population) starts in the 1967 when the foreign 
residence in Germany starts to be reported on annual basis. The data are not available for 
foreign-born population so they are based on the ethnicity principle. 
According to the German Statistical Office, there are two breaks in migration stock data 
series. The first one happened in 1972 due to the change from paper-based to computer-base 
statistic. This transfer caused minor statistical break in some countries. In order to deal with 
that, the methodology used in Alvarez-Plata et al (2003) is adapted. It appears that after 
including of dummy variable to control this break, the dummy variable is insignificant.  
The second break in the data occurred during the period from 1987 to 1989 because of the 
revision of the statistics for foreigners that had to follow the directive of the population 
census of 1987. This had a consequence of significant reduction in foreign citizens stocks for 
the period of three years. However, after this period the statistics were again based on the   7 
former methodology. This break is solved by recalculating of foreign residence for affected 
three years
1.     
Dependent variables  are normalized  with the home countries population representing the 
difference in migration stocks as a % of the original home population. Although this is not 
exactly the net migration rate, comparing these figures seems reasonable upon accepting 
certain assumptions. The difference could be in different population growth rates, i.e. of 
population in original home country and of appropriate population of foreign citizens in 
receiving country (in this case Germany) and also in the rate of naturalization. Equation 1 
below shows the relation between net migration and difference in migration stocks.    













w here mstfh denotes the ratio of the stock of foreign residence from country  f in home 
country h (Germany) to the original home population, mfh is the ration of actual net migration 
of foreigners from country f into home country h to the original home population, gh is the 
natural growth of population in the original home country, g f  is the growth of migrant 
population in Germany, δ f is the rate of naturalization of foreign population in Germany. The 
index t denotes the time period. From the equation above it is clear that net migration equals 
the migration stock if  the numerator of the fraction is equal to  zero.  It is assumed that 
population growth rates are equal and the naturalization rates are zero.      
 
 
3. Empirical model. 
 
 
The first part of the theoretical model is consistent with those models based on human capital 
approach (see for example Sjaastad 1962, Harris and Todaro 1970, or Hatton 1995) and deals 
with investment in human capital and expected future income.  The model  applies the 
econometric methods used by Boeri and Brücker (2000) and Alvarez-Plata, Brücker and 
Siliverstovs (2003) in estimating migration from CEEC into the EU15.  




                                                 
1 Dividing of the difference in the number of foreign residents between 1986 and 1989 by total net immigration 
in this time period, and multiplied this factor by annual net immigration in order to calculate the change in the 
number of foreign residents in each year. For more information on this methodology see Alvarez-Plata et al. 
(2003).  
   8 
3.1. Introduction to the model. 
 
In line with above-mentioned studies an assumption that people make expectations regarding 
the future income in the target (host) country and source (home) country is accepted. The 
differences in the past values of those incomes are creating individuals’ expectations about 
the  future possible income. GDP per capita of a country is thus taken as a proxy for 
individuals’ incomes both in source and target countries. The average employment rate in 
both target and source country is taken as a proxy for the labor market conditions. More 
precisely, individual probability of finding a job is rising with higher employment and vise 
versa. The lagged migration stocks serves as a proxy for network effects. If migration flows 
are based on expectations about past variables that mean present values are influenced by 
past values (Hatton 1995) thus it should be first-order autoregressive process (AR (1)). 
Therefore a simple error-correction model can be constructed in the following way
2:  
 






mfh,t      the share of migrants from home country h living in country f    
    (i.e. Germany) as a % of home population h.   
wf,t/wh,t    foreign to home country income difference    
wh,t    home country income 
ef,t     German employment rate 
eh,t     country of origin employment rate 
mfh,t-1      lagged migrants stock of home country h in country f (Germany)  
DummyF  dummy variable for the free movement of labor  
t, t-1     denotes time periods    
As it is obvious, variables enter the equation  1  both  as  steady  levels and  as variables’ 
differences.  Variables’ differences show the short term reaction of migration to these 
fluctuations, on the other hand the levels of the variables determine the long-run relations 
                                                 
2 An error-correction model is a dynamic model in which the movement of the variables in any periods is 



































+++  9 
between migration stocks and appropriate variables. The equilibrium stock of migrants can 
be thence derive from equation 1 by setting all changes equal to nil and getting steady state 

























         
       
where  m fh is the steady state equilibrium rate of the foreign migrants to the source 
population.  β in brackets are therefore semi-elasticities in the long-run equilibrium and 
denote the relation between stocks of migrants and explanatory variables. The coefficient β9 
is expected to be negative; hence the signs of the original coefficients will be not changed. 
Negative sign of the coefficient is expected due to assumption that migration follows AR(1) 
process. Hence mt=ηmt-1 where η must be smaller than 1. If this condition does not hold, the 
whole population of the source country will migrate. The part of equation 2 can be re-written 
















                                                             
 
Thus, it appears that β9 should be negative to assure the sustainability of migration. If the β9 
were even slightly positive, the coefficient before lagged migration would have been larger 
than one and this would have led to unsustainable migration explosion.      
In order to formulate the error correction model shown in equation 1, it has to be proved that 
all variables have to be cointegrated in order to form a dynamic long-term equilibrium (see 
Johnson, 2001). To achieve that a two-stage cointegration test was performed and it was 
proved that the available data constitute cointegrated set. This makes it possible to continue 
with testing the main model without any restrictions.  
 
3.2. Model estimations. 
 
Econometric model applied here for estimating stocks of immigrants in Germany included 
date on the 18 source countries, i.e. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, 
Holland, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Spain, Turkey and UK. As noted above, Germany was chosen as a target country because of 
the size of migration community and the relative accessibility of data. These panel data are 
                                                 
3 Variable t was left out from the equation in order to indicate the long-term equilibrium.    10 
characterized by smaller cross-section dimension (18 cross-sections)  and relatively larger 
time dimension (39 annual observations).   
Variables were tested for the cointegration (in order to see whether the long-term equilibrium 
between migration stocks and explanatory variables existed) that showed that they formed 
the cointegration set (e.g. they passed the two-stage process). Thence, estimation of the long-
term equilibrium parameters from the equation 1 was legitimate. The changes of variables for 
steady stage were set at zero, which allowed estimating equation 2.     
A part of cointegration, the cross-section pooling of data, can involve further restrictions that 
may cause problems to the regression results. In the research literature a whole variety of 
estimators for estimating such panel data is used. From the assumptions presented here (and 
based on similar studies - see for example Alvarez-Plata, Brücker, and Siliverstovs, 2003) it 
appeared that the most efficient estimator in this framework was the Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression (SUR). However, it also appeared relevant to estimate the model using classical 
panel data Least Squares (PLS) and General method of moments (GMM).  
Furthermore, variable denoting the employment rate in country of origin (domestic income) 
had to be eliminated from equation 2 due to the fact that it proved to be insignificant in all 
estimations (it appeared to be redundant due because the null hypothesis of insignificancy of 


















w here  
mfht  -               the dependent variable representing the share of migrants from source  
country h living in target country f as a % of source country population h.   
wht –     country of origin income level 
wft/wht –   foreign to home country income difference    
eft –     German employment rate 
mfh,t-1 –   lagged migrants stock of home country h in country f (Germany)   
mfh,t-2 –   lagged migrants stock of home country h in country f (Germany)   
Zfh –      vector of time-invariant variables which affect the migration  
between two countries such as geographical proximity and language.  
dummy –   Free mobility of labour. 
 
3.2.1. Results and stability tests.   11 
 
The results of the estimations are shown in table 2. Estimators reject the null hypothesis of 
insignificancy of all variables at the 1 % level, with the exception of income differential in 
PLS that is significant on the 5 % level and is insignificant in GMM estimator. The results 
confirm that SUR estimation is the most powerful one here due to the Hausman test that 
could not reject the null hypothesis. The issue that could distort the estimation results is 
heteroscedasticity. This could be caused by heterogeneity of countries, so that variances of 
the explanatory variables do not have to be distributed evenly across the sample. This might 
lead to the inefficient results and to the preference of SUR estimator.  
 
Table 2: Panel data estimation results  
C ** -4.2034 **
wht ** ** 0.0444 **
wft/wht  * 0.0422 **
eft  ** ** 0.7398 **
mfh,t-1  ** ** 1.3536 **
mfh,t-2  ** ** -0.4929 **
Dummy ** ** 0.0152 **
**,* coefficients are significant at 1 and 5% level, respectively







PLS GMM  SUR
-4.5302
Source: Own computations (using eViews 6® ).    
 
The correlation of error terms across countries that could be caused by common shocks were 
tested by Wald test that rejected the null hypothesis about the errors being serially 
uncorrelated against the alternative one that they were correlated. Hence, the common shocks 
were present in the data. This finding was in line with the expectation that the variables used 
in the model fit into the global economic framework and therefore were not independent.          
Table 3 specifies the model and shows different data adjustments that had to be made due to 
the assumptions applied on estimators.   
 
Table 3: Models’ specifications   
   PLS  GMM   SUR 
Sample (adjusted)  1969 2005  1970 2005  1969 2005 
Cross sections  18  18  18 
Total panel observations 
(balanced) 
666  648  666 
Source: Own computations (using eViews 6® ).  
   12 
The estimated model is based on SUR regression due to the results of Hausman test with 
fixed cross section effects and it can be presented in the final form:  














   
w here fh Z  for Turkey is equal to 0.2875. The redundancy of fixed effects and presence of 
random cross section effects were tested for. The Likelihood ratio that uses sum-of-squares 
(F-statistic) was applied and the statistic value and an appropriate ρ-statistics strictly rejected 
the null hypothesis of redundancy of fixed effects. Stability of coefficients was also made by 
using a classical F-test with Χ
2 distribution. The main results of the model specified by 
equation 5 can be summarized as follows: 
•  In accordance with preliminary expectations i ncome differential has positive and 
significant impact on migration. 1 % increase in the income differentials leads to the 0.04 
% increase  in migration. Furthermore, the income in the  source countries is also 
significant and has a positive impact on migration. The effect of 1 % increase in the 
source countries income will have a 0.04 % impact on migration.  
•  Employment rate in Germany (used as an indicator of the labor market conditions) also 
has the expected sign. The impact of employment rate is significant and positive. % 
increase in the employment rate in Germany leads to the 0.74 % increase in migration.  
•  Lagged variables of migration have significant and positive impact on migration. That 
represents the crucial network effect that makes 0.86 % of former migration..   
•  The dummy variable has a positive sign and it is significant, however its impact is rather 
small. It might be that migrants with the biggest incentives to move have already done so 
before introduction of free movement of labor. Hence, migration flows appear not to be 
much influenced by the free movement of labor.                   
A short notion should be made on the use of estimators. There is a large scale of different 
estimators to be used for dynamic panel data estimations that can be found in the research 
literature. The panel data used for the estimation of migration into Germany in this paper is 
two dimensional, i.e. differences both between time periods and between countries might be 
observed. Thus, for the purpose of this research SUR estimator with the best forecasting 
performance was applied. This is in accord with the similar studies (see for example Alvarez-
Plata, Brücker and Silverstovs, 2003).   
       13 
3.3. Simulation of migration: 2006-2030. 
 
In this sub-section migration from Turkey into Germany is simulated based on the results 
obtained from the main model. The projection has three scenarios that are described below. 
The estimated results as well as the exogenous variables might not exactly reflect the reality, 
thence they should be taken with care. Nevertheless, with the given level of available data 
they present the best possible simulations of migration from Turkey. 
A short explanation of the cross-section variable, in other words o f the country-specific 
effect, is needed before presenting the results of simulations. The country-specific effect 
captures the characteristics specific for each country that might effect migration. The most 
important examples of this variable are: distance, culture, language or education. Due to a 
short time horizon of each cross  section  these country-specific effects are not split  into 
further segments. The most important issue is that Turkey is also incorporated in the sample 
countries, which means that the country-specific effect for Turkey was accounted for 0.2875. 
This effect is therefore used as a country-specific constant during the whole simulated period.                  
        
3.3.1. Assumptions about exogenous variables.  
       
In this sub-section exogenous variables and  their expected development in the forecasted 
period form 2006 till 2030 are shortly described. Assumptions about exogenous variables are 
crucial for the migration forecasts and therefore special attention is paid on their possible 
development whilst they are applied for steering the migration scenarios. There are three 




German and Turkish populations  do not enter projections directly.  However, they are 
substantial for them. The data about population was taken from Eurostat and the predicted 
values were based on World Bank population projections. As a secondary source United 






Figure 2: Projections of German population from 







1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035
Population Germany WB Population Germany UN  
 














1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035
Population Turkey WB Population Turley UN  
Source: Eurostat, World Bank, United Nations, 2007      Source: Eurostat, World Bank, United Nations, 2007 
 
Turkish population seems to represent a more important but more unstable variable. It enters 
the model as a numerator of the actual migration stocks (Figure 3).  
In another words, changes of total population might heavily influence the migration stocks in 
target country. Sources of population projections in Turkey are the same as for Germany. 
Table 3 shows that the Turkish population will increase in the future but the increment will 
be decreasing. Population figures show the well-known trend that the population in the West 
is ageing and there might be a need for migrants to fill the gaps in the productive population 




The GDP per capita enters the migration forecast in two ways: first, the stand-alone GDP per 
capita of Turkey as a proxy of economic situation in Turkey; and second, as the ratio of 
Turkish GDP p.p. to German GDP p.p. The GDP data were obtained from Eurostat and the 
projections were made  using the following assumption:  in  the  realistic scenario  it  was 
assumed that Turkish GDP p.p. would grow 4 % p.a. from 2007 on and that German GDP 
p.p. would increase by 2 % p.a.
4. Figure 4 shows GDP p.p. development as well as the 







                                                 
4 The growth rates were taken from Eurostat, World Bank and OECD and capture the assumption of strong 
growth rate in developing countries due to a next wave of globalization.    15 













































Source: Eurostat, 2007; own computations. 
 
German unification in 1991 decreased the GDP p.p. in Germany; however the drop was 
smooth and the growth of GDP decelerated in the following years. It should be noted that the 
income difference is stable in absolute terms, hence the ratio is increasing (i.e. the income 
difference in %s is shrinking).       
 
Unemployment   
 
Originally both German and Turkish employment was of an interest in the mainframe of this 
research. However, due to the fact that the null hypothesis of insignificants of the source 
country employment variable was not rejected, the Turkish employment was not included in 
any of the simulations. On the other hand, German employment as a proxy of labor market 
conditions in Germany  represents  a strong migration driver. The significant drop in 
employment level in 1991 is caused by German unification. The actual figures are completed 
by projections that were made as an average of last 10 years and assumed to be constant on a 
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Source: Eurostat, 2007; own computations 
 
The methodology of variables projection corresponds with the migration literature (see for 
example Erzan et al., 2004; Alvarez-Plata et al., 2003; Boeri, Brücker, 2001).    
 
3.3.2. Scenarios and results. 
 
In this sub-section three different scenarios of what might happen to Turkish migration to 
Germany after EU accession  are  presented: realistic scenario, optimistic scenario and 
pessimistic scenario. The optimistic and pessimistic scenarios do not concern the number of 
migrants but are rather based on Turkish economic development and integration point of 
view.   
 
Realistic scenario   
 
In the realistic scenario e mployment rate remains unchanged and GDP in Germany and 
Turkey grows at rate 2 % and 4 % p.a. respectively. Moreover, dummy variable for free 
movement of labor from the year 2025 is employed because of the possible Turkey  EU 
accession or similar agreements that would have the effect on free movement of labor. The 
results are reported in figure 6 below. 
In the realistic scenario the migration flow reaches its top in the 2009 and than decreases. A 
slight increase  can be observed after simulated EU accession. The migration flows are 
marginal after 2030 onwards. This is mainly caused by ageing of Turkish population. The 
number of Turks living in Germany is stabilized at the 3.2 millions and the initial peak of   17 
migration flows in 2009 is caused by the gap that appears in the beginning of 21
st century in a 
migration flows from Turkey. Thence, the model is trying to compensate it and get the 
migration to the standard level. 
 

















































Migrant stocks Migration flows
Introduction of 
the free movemnt 
of labor - 2025
 
Source: Own computations. 
 
It should be noted that migration flows are average migrations over time intervals and that 
they are expected to change in the course of business cycles. Migration stocks remain stable 
from 2015 onwards, hence the forecasted migration stocks of Turks in Germany is 
approximately 3.2 million people. However, the % of Turkish migrants to the total Turkish 
population slightly decreases from 2015, perhaps due to the Turkish population projections. 
On the other hand, the % of Turkish migrants to the total German population increases.       
Optimistic scenario 
 
In the optimistic scenario faster convergence of Turkish economy to the German level is 
assumed. Moreover, the integration process of Turkey into the EU also happens earlier. GDP 
per capita of Turkey converges to the German GDP per capita in a rate of 4 % p.a. and free 
movement of labor is introduced in 2020. The employment rates remain constant as in the 
realistic scenario. The results of the simulation are reported in figure 7. 
It can be seen that in the optimistic scenario the development of migration is similar to the 
realistic: migration decreases from 2009 and than raises slightly after the introduction of free 
movement of labor. However, the whole convergence process to the steady state is faster and   18 
the total amount of migrants residing in Germany in 2030 is approximately 3.1 million, i.e. 
0.1 million lower.   
 











































































































































Migrant stocks Migration flows
Introduction of the 
free movemnt of 
labor - 2020
    
Source: Own computations. 
 
Pessimistic scenario    
 
In the pessimistic scenario the GDP convergence does not exist at all. In other words, the 
German GDP per capita grows as fast as the Turkish GDP per capita for the whole simulated 
period. Furthermore, it is assumed that the free movement of labor between Turkey and 
Germany is not introduced at all. The employment rate in Germany is set about 2 % higher 
compared to the base case and then remains stable.     
 












































































































































Migration stocks Migration flows  
Source: Own computations.   19 
In the pessimistic scenario, the faster increase of migrations from Turkey to Germany is 
observed (Figure 8). However, the increase after introduction of free movement of labor is 
missing, thus the final stock of migrants is not that pessimistic as one could have expected. 
The total amount of Turkish migrants in Germany in 2030 is about 3.3 million. That is 100 
thousand more migrants compared to the realistic scenario.    
 
Sensitivity 
   
Sensitivity of estimated results should be accounted for. The impact of GDP per capita both 
in Turkey and Germany on the stocks of Turkish residents living in Germany is rather small 
in the long run. Thus, there exists relatively low elasticity between the migrant stock and 
GDP per capita in Turkey, as well as between the income differential.  
 
Table 4: GDP growth sensitivity analysis  
GDP per capita 
Growth  Stocks of residents (Thousands) 
  
   Germany  Turkey  2020  2030 
No growth  0%  0%  2,786  3,078 
   0%  4%  2,793  3,091 
   0%  8%  2,799  3,103 
   2%  0%  2,849  3,200 
Base case  2%  4%  2,855  3,213 
   2%  8%  2,862  3,225 
   4%  0%  2,910  3,320 
   4%  4%  2,917  3,332 
High growth  4%  8%  2,923  3,344 
Source: Own computations. 
 
It  becomes clear that German GDP represents the strongest migration incentive. Turkish 
GDP growth is, on the other hand,  irrelevant  mostly because of the coefficients of t he 
variables where the Turkish GDP is employed (Turkish GDP is presented also as a 
denominator of income difference variable
 ). The other exogenous variables were taken from 
the realistic scenario (see Table 4).   
German employment rate (see Table 5) seems to have greater impact on migration stock. The 
% change in employment rate in Germany (used as a proxy for the German labour market 
conditions) affects the migration stock of Turks living in Germany stronger than a % change 
in German or Turkish GDP per capita. The other variables are taken from the base case.  
No doubt, the real migration figures may highly deviate from  the  obtained  results and 
projections. Some factors might influence migration stocks stronger than the variables used   20 
in this model. Those might be country specific conditions, such as the issue of Northern 
Cyprus,  Kurdish minority issues or unpredictable radicalization of Turkish political 
representation. All these issues, if triggered, might potentially lead to international isolation 
of Turkey which will, in its turn, cause higher migrations due to political refugees or asylum-
seekers. 
 
Table 5: Employment rate sensitivity analysis   
Stocks of residents (Thousands)   
Employment 
rate (%)  2020  2030 
Low Emp.  89  2,729  3,077 
  90  2,779  3,131 
  91  2,829  3,185 
Base case  91.5  2,855  3,213 
  92  2,878  3,237 
  93  2,927  3,289 
High Emp.  94  2,976  3,341 
Source: Own computations. 
 
On the contrary, there m ight  occur  a significant decrease of migration due to stronger 
migration barriers or nationality. Secondly, per capita income in Turkey is much lower than 
in most EU countries, thus the income gap is extreme and could also change abruptly. Third, 
the negotiation and agreements with the EU will be also crucial and Turkish cooperation with 
the EU might also have significant impacts on migration.  
 
3.4. Extrapolation to EU 15   
 
The next step is the extrapolation of the results for the whole EU15. Taking into account that 
about 76  % of all Turkish immigrants in today’s EU live in Germany, results from the 
scenarios above can be extrapolated for the EU15. In all scenarios a stock of some 3 million 
residents from Turkey is expected to live in EU15 in 2010. As the time count reaches the 
2020 the scenarios start to vary more significantly and by the 2030 there is expected to be 
from 4.0 to 4.4 million Turks living in EU15.     
Nevertheless, it has to be noted that the extrapolation shown in Figure 9 is subjected to one 
important restrictive assumption. This is that the distribution of Turkish migrants in 2004 
across the EU15 countries might remain constant over the whole period included into the 
simulation (2010-2030). Indeed, current migration stocks and flows depend on underlying   21 
economic variables that can change over time, moreover institutional restrictions may also 
disappear. 
 




























Base case Optimistic Pesimistic   
Source: Own computations. 
 
However, country specific reasons for migration seem to be relatively stable in the past. 
Therefore, the extrapolation  of Turkish migration into Germany to the EU15 gives a 





The major outcome of this paper is the following: in the case of Turkish EU accession the 
envisaged stocks of Turkish migrants in the EU15 should not increase dramatically. The 
results stemming from  the estimations in this paper show that p ost-accession annual 
migration flows from Turkey to the EU15 might be as high as 40 thousand people in the long 
run. The experience with former EU enlargements supports these findings.  
It should be acknowledged that the EU can not afford to have a “zero migration” policy 
under current institutional framework. Furthermore, a successful accession period with high 
growth and implementation of the reforms is actually leading to elimination of the migration 
pressures. There is no “a priori”  reason why Turkey should go via different path. More 
precisely, the Turks with the strongest incentives to migrate had already settled in the EU 
(mostly Germany).   22 
The results of this paper also suggest that Turkish convergence to the EU might be important 
for narrowing the income differences and improving of other economic and trade relations. 
However, the impact of economic convergence or introduction of free movement of labour 
on migration is not very significant (the network effects seem to prevail). On the other hand, 
factors such a minority rights or Kurdish question, can significantly change the character of 
migration and thus also the migrants flows.   
There are also other implications arising from this paper. First of all, it should be reminded 
that  the  results  presented here should be t aken with great care. The uncertainty  about 
migrations from Turkey after  its possible EU  accession  still  prevails. The simulation of 
possible Turkish migration presented in this paper is based on an empirical model that shows 
dependence of migration  to Germany on income differential, employment rate and an 
institutional factor of free movement of labour across the EU. However, some issues that 
could have distorted the results (i.e. institutional reform in the EU and its migration policy, 
political crises in Turkey, a halt in Turkish economic convergence to the EU, major crisis 
involving Kurdish minority, women rights, Cyprus conflict or abortion of Turkey EU 
accession process) were left out from the model. 
Second, the cross-section character of the regressions used in the paper did not allow for 
period adjustment which could play a key role in migrations flows. It also seems complicated 
to compare the data on Turkey and other emigration countries. On average, the income gap is 
significantly larger between Germany and Turkey than between Germany and most of the 
other source countries. With this in mind, it seems quite complicated to make predictions. 
Third, results  presented  in this study  might be biased  due to a recent t rend in Turkish 
migration stocks: the decrease in migration in recent years might not be fully captured in the 
model and the forecasted values might be overestimated. Nevertheless, if this is controlled 
for, migration inflows to the EU15 are stabilized at between 32 to 50 thousands Turkish 
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